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Workers' Compensation

by H. Michael Bagley*
Daniel C. Kniffen**

Katherine D. Dixon*
and
Marion Handley Martin***
For the second year in a row, the survey period passed without
dramatic legislative changes to Georgia's Workers' Compensation Act
("the Act").' Georgia's appellate courts, however, were active once again
in examining the exclusive remedy doctrine and interpreting the Act's
subrogation provisions.
I.

LEGISLATION

As it has virtually every year this decade, the 1999 Georgia General
Assembly made a number of amendments to the Act. This legislation
marks the sixth consecutive year that legislation was passed based upon
a package drafted under the direction of the Chairman of the State
Board of Workers Compensation ("the Board"), Judge Harrill Dawkins.
The following changes in the Act became effective July 1, 1999:

* Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1977); University of Georgia (J.D., 1980). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Drew, Ecki & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1981; J.D., cum laude, 1984). Member, Mercer Law
Review (1982-1984); Editor in Chief (1983-1984). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1983); University of Georgia (J.D., cum laude, 1990). Executive Editor,
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1989-1990). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
**** Senior Associate in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
Davidson College (B.A., cum laude, 1989); University of Georgia (J.D., 1993). Notes Editor,
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1992-1993). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
1. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -421 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
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Appeal of Decisions

Previously, the Act was silent regarding the right of a party to crossappeal following an appeal by another party of a decision of an
administrative law judge. This was clarified with a provision specifying
that an appellee may institute a cross-appeal by filing notice of the
action within thirty days of the notice of the award by the administrative law judge.2
B.

Self-Insured Employers

Although the Board has been empowered to issue certificates relating
to self-insurance for some time,' the Act was silent on the issue of
whether this included the right to review the self-insured status of an
employer following merger or acquisition.4 This amendment allows the
Board to review the status of a self-insured employer after its involvement in a merger or acquisition.5 The Board will determine whether
the employer continues to meet the self-insurance requirements 6of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 34-9-121.
C. Appointment of Guardianfor Minor or Incompetent Claimant
Until 1996 the Board was vested with broad authority to appoint
guardians for minors and incompetents who were claimants in the
workers' compensation system.7 The Board, however, was not vested
with the authority or the funding for the necessary personnel to insure
that these guardians performed their duties properly. In this setting the
1996 legislature removed all Board authority and referred all issues of
guardianship under the Act to the probate court in the county of
residence of the minor or legally incompetent person.8 This resulted in
delays that were unacceptable in a system designed to react quickly.
Therefore, this year the Board was again vested with the authority to
appoint guardians for minors or legally incompetent persons, in limited
circumstances and for periods of limited duration. 9 The circumstances
include the following: (1) the receipt and administration of income
benefits for a period not to exceed fifty-two weeks; (2) the compromise

2. Id. §
3. Id. §
4. Id. §
5. Id. §

34-9-103.
34-9-127.
34-9-127.
34-9-127(b).

6.
7.

Id.
1987 Ga. Laws 396.

8.
9.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226 (1998).
Id. § 34-9-226 (Supp. 1999).
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and termination of any claim and the receipt of any sum paid in
settlement where the net settlement amount approved by the Board does
not exceed $25,000; and (3) in the event the minor or incompetent person
does not have a duly appointed guardian, the Board may appoint a
temporary guardian ad litem for a period not to exceed fifty-two weeks,
to institute or defend an action under the Act.10 The fifty-two-week
periods may be renewed or extended by order of the Board."
D.

Claims for Reimbursement

The legislature clarified the Board's authority to order a reimbursement of an overpayment of indemnity benefits to a claimant. 12 The
request for reimbursement must be made within two years from the date
of the overpayment. 3
E.

Indemnity Benefits

The legislature increased the rate for temporary total disability
14
("TTD") benefits from a maximum of $325 a week to $350 a week.
The minimum TTD benefit payable is now $35 a week.' 5 The maximum rate for temporary partial disability ("TPD") benefits was increased
from $216.67 a week to $233.33 a week.'"
F

Compensation for Work-Related Death

The provisions dealing with compensation in the event of a workrelated death have needed clarification for some time. The legislature
deleted the language referencing the payment of reasonable expenses for
the employee's last sickness in a death case, as the payment of these
benefits was required elsewhere in the Act.' 7 Arguably the language
had created the unintended result of limiting the expenses related to the
employee's last sickness to the maximum allowable for burial. The
amount payable for burial expenses was increased from $5,000 to
$7,500.18

10.

Id. § 34-9-226(b).

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. § 34-9-226(b)(3).
Id. § 34-9-245.
Id.
Id. § 34-9-261.
Id.

16. Id. § 34-9-262.
17. Id. § 34-9-265(b).
18. Id.
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II. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
The attack on the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act continued
during this survey period, including two significant decisions from the
Georgia Supreme Court. In FlintElectricMembership Corp. v. Ed Smith
Construction Co.,"9 a construction company employee who was injured
when he came into contact with a high voltage line brought a negligence
action against the power-line owner. The power-line owner sought
indemnification from the injured worker's employer pursuant to the High
Voltage Safety Act."0 The employer successfully raised the exclusive
remedy provision of the Act to obtain summary judgment in the
indemnity action at the superior court level.21 On appeal, the supreme
court reversed the lower court and all earlier decisions supporting the
lower court.22 The court found that the indemnity action was not
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act because it was not
an action by an injured employee "on account of'a work-related injury,
but rather a contractual indemnity action. 2' This clearly creates a very
limited exception to the exclusive remedy.
The Supreme Court of Georgia articulated a potentially broader
exception to the exclusive remedy with its decision in Potts v. UAP-GA.
AG CHEM., Inc.,24 which once again creates the possibility of civil
actions against employers and insurers based upon circumstances
related to the handling of medical treatment in workers' compensation
claims.25
In Potts the employee became ill after cleaning chemicals for his
employer. Treatment was initiated for suspected chemical poisoning, but
one doctor discontinued the treatment stating that he had been
reassured by a representative of the employer that the employee could
not have possibly been exposed to any chemicals at work.28 The
employee eventually died, and his survivors filed a workers' compensation claim for dependency benefits asserting that the deceased employee
"'was exposed to toxic and poisonous materials and died as a result of

19. 270 Ga. 464, 511 S.E.2d 160 (1999).
20.
21.
22.

O.C.G.A. § 46-3-30 to -40 (1992 & Supp. 1999).
270 Ga. at 464, 511 S.E.2d at 161.
Id. at 466, 511 S.E.2d at 162. See Georgia Power Co. v. Franco Remodeling Co., 233

Ga. App. 640, 505 S.E.2d 488 (1998); City of Dalton v. Gene Rogers Const. Co., 223 Ga.
App. 819, 479 S.E.2d 171 (1996).
23. 270 Ga. at 465, 511 S.E.2d at 161-62.
24. 270 Ga. 14, 506 S.E.2d 101 (1998).
25. See id.
26. Id. at 14, 506 S.E.2d at 102.
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this exposure. ' "" The survivors also brought a wrongful death action
in the Superior Court of Fulton County against the employer and its
branch manager, alleging fraud and intentional infliction of emotional
distress based primarily upon the representations allegedly made to
medical
providers regarding the absence of any exposure to chemicals at
28
work.
The superior court granted summary judgment in the civil action for
the employer and branch manager based upon the finding that the
exclusive remedy of the Act extends to intentional misconduct by the
employer done off the work site and at times that the employer is not
engaged in any work activity.29 The court of appeals affirmed.3 ° On
certiorari, the supreme court reversed, finding that any damages
resulting from fraud do not arise out of and in the course of employment
if they result from intentional misconduct by the employer subsequent
to the physical injuries that gave rise to the original workers' compensation claim. 3' Thus, the specter of civil litigation spawned out of
workers' compensation claims again raises its head and warrants a
review of the doctrine of exclusive remedy.
A.

Background

The exclusive remedy doctrine functions as the most fundamental
premise of the workers' compensation system and precludes an employee
injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment
from pursuing a civil liability claim against the employer or the
employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier.32 The very origin
of workers' compensation was based upon a quid pro quo: employers
established a system providing employees with income benefits and
medical care without issues of fault if employees relinquished the
common law right to sue in tort for injuries on the job. The controlling
factor for determining whether the exclusive remedy doctrine applies is
whether the Act covers the parties and the event.
Historically, the judicially recognized exceptions to the exclusive
remedy doctrine have been strictly limited to seven specific circumstances which are: (1) purely personal intentional acts; 33 (2) the "dual

27. 227 Ga. App. 841, 844, 490 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1997).
28. Id. at 842-44, 490 S.E.2d at 433-34.
29. 270 Ga. at 15, 506 S.E.2d at 102.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 16-17, 506 S.E.2d at 103.
32. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
33. When co-employees, the employer, or third parties direct willful and intentional acts
against a nonparticipating victim for purely non-work-related personal reasons, resulting
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persona" doctrine; 4 (3) failure to provide workers' compensation
insurance; 5 (4) property damage;3 6 (5) negligent inspection;3 7 (6)
indemnity agreements;"5 and (7) fraud. 39 These exceptions to the
exclusive remedy doctrine have developed to deal rationally and
consistently with matters either outside of the workers' compensation
system or to draw a distinct line for circumstances lying on the
periphery.
The Georgia Supreme Court has specifically denied civil actions for
delay in payment of medical benefits.4 ° In Doss v. Food Lion, Inc.,4
the supreme court found that an independent cause of action in tort for
the intentional delay of medical treatment in a workers' compensation
claim was "inconsistent with the public policy behind the statutory
scheme," thereby barring the viability of any tort action on that
theory.42 Therefore, the supreme court specifically reversed Zurich

injuries are not covered by the Act. Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 186 Ga. App. 867,
867-68, 368 S.E.2d 813,814-15 (1988); see Bright v. Nimmo, 756 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1985);
Brown v. Trefz & Trefz, 173 Ga. App. 586, 327 S.E.2d 556 (1985).
34. "For the dual persona doctrine to apply, the duties imposed upon the second
persona must be totally separate from those imposed by the employer-employee
relationship." Doggett v. Patrick, 197 Ga. App. 420, 421, 398 S.E.2d 770, 771 (1990). For
an in-depth discussion of the impact of this case, see H. Michael Bagley, et al., Workers'
Compensation, 43 MERCER L. REV. 475, 489-90 (1991).
35. The exclusive remedy doctrine does not protect an employer's agent who fails to
provide workers' compensation insurance when an employee has a valid workers'
compensation claim and is granted a valid award by the Board, and the employer is
insolvent. See, e.g., Samuel v. Baitcher, 247 Ga. 71, 274 S.E.2d 327 (1981); Myers v.
Wilson, 167 Ga. App. 340, 306 S.E.2d 401 (1983); Lavender v. Spetalnick, 161 Ga. App. 75,
289 S.E.2d 291 (1982).
36. The exclusive remedy doctrine does not prevent an employee from suing in tort to
recover damage to property, such as clothing. Any accompanying claim for punitive
damages, however, is barred when the property damage is the result of a compensable
physical injury under the Act because the Act provides remedies for the employer's conduct.
See Superb Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Thomason, 183 Ga. App. 554, 359 S.E.2d 370 (1987).
37. See Newton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 148 Ga. App. 694, 252 S.E.2d 199 (1979).
38. Georgia law has recognized that the exclusive remedy does not prevent contractual
indemnity actions against employers who have paid injured employees workers'
compensation benefits by third parties. See, e.g., General Telephone Co. of the Southeast
v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 95, 311 S.E.2d 460 (1984).
39. See, e.g., Griggs v. All-Steel Bldgs., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 253, 433 S.E.2d 89 (1993);
Cline v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 137 Ga. App. 76, 223 S.E.2d 14 (1975).
40. See Doss v. Food Lion, Inc., 267 Ga. 312, 477 S.E.2d 577 (1996); Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Davis, 253 Ga. 376, 320 S.E.2d 368 (1984). Likewise, the court has specifically
denied civil actions for delay in payment of income benefits. See Bright v. Nimmo, 253 Ga.
378, 381, 320 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1984).
41. 267 Ga. 312, 477 S.E.2d 577 (1996).
42. Id. at 312, 477 S.E.2d at 577.
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American Insurance Co. v. Dicks,43 in which the court of appeals
reached a contrary conclusion." The court specifically addressed the
issue of public policy and pointed out that the exclusive remedy
provision was "the bedrock of the workers' compensation system" because
it was the "quid pro quo for workers receiving a guaranty of prompt
benefits for work-related injuries without regard to fault or common law
defenses and without the delay inherent in tort litigation."4 5 The court
further articulated the reality that workers' compensation "has never
been intended to make the employee whole-it excludes benefits for pain
and suffering,
for loss of consortium, and it provides a cap on wage bene46
fits."

Despite the requirement of "injury by accident," it is unquestionable
that the Act provides remedies for intentional physical injuries. Early
in the development of the law interpreting the exclusive remedy, the
courts expanded the term "accident" to incorporate physical injuries
caused by the intentional conduct of an employer arising out of and in
the course of employment.47
Furthermore, in Southwire Co. v.Benefield,4" a case which is difficult
to distinguish from Potts, the employee alleged that the employer and
company doctor had intentionally withheld knowledge of the employee's
exposure to lead poisoning in the work place, thereby preventing him
from getting proper medical treatment and aggravating the effects of the
poisoning.49 The court reasoned that because lead poisoning was an
occupational disease and compensable under the Act, workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy.50 The court specifically rejected the
trend in other jurisdictions that permits employees to pursue tort actions
for fraudulently concealing the nature of an injury caused by hazardous
materials in the work place.5 Significantly, the court limited the
employee's remedy to the Act even though the employee incurred greater
physical harm due to the employer's alleged intentional conduct.5 2 In

43.
44.
45.
46.

220 Ga. App. 725, 470 S.E.2d 279 (1996).
267 Ga. at 313, 477 S.E.2d at 578.
Id.
Id.

47. See, e.g., Sands v. Union Camp Corp., 559 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1977); Southern Wire
& Iron, Inc. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738 (1962); McLaughlin v. Thompson,
Boland & Lee, Inc., 72 Ga. App. 564, 34 S.E.2d 562 (1945); Reid v. Lummus Cotton-Gin Co.,
58 Ga. App. 184, 197 S.E. 904 (1938).
48. 184 Ga. App. 418, 361 S.E.2d 525 (1987).

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 418, 361 S.E.2d at 525.
Id. at 418-19, 361 S.E.2d at 525-26.
Id.
Id.
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a special concurring opinion, Judge (now Justice) Benham noted that the
court was "powerless" to change the rule; the change must come from the
53
In Potts, however, Justice Benham was among the
legislature.
54
majority.
B.

Fraud:a Broader Exception?

As indicated above, fraud has been an exception to the exclusive
remedy, but it is an exception that has historically been reserved for the
fraudulent inducement to settle.55 The decision in Potts specifically
excepts from the exclusive remedy bar fraud "committed by the employer
or a co-employee where the tortious 'act is not an accident arising out of
for
and in the course of employment and where a reasonable remedy
' 56
such conduct is not provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. '
On March 3, 1999, the court of appeals addressed the applicability of
57
The employee
Potts under the facts of Dove v. Sentry Insurance.
experienced a work-related injury and committed suicide within four
months due to a prescription drug overdose. Initially, the employee's
widow instituted a workers' compensation claim for death benefits. The
parties ultimately settled this matter. 58
Thereafter, the employee's widow filed a tort action against the
employer's insurance company. The complaint alleged wrongful death,
pain and suffering, and punitive damages stemming from the insurer's
refusal to pay for additional testing recommended by the treating
physicians. According to the complaint, these actions were intentional
and caused the employee's death. The insurance company moved for
summary judgment, which was granted.5 9
The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment, finding
that the widow's cause of action was controlled by Doss.6 ° In Doss the
supreme court specifically held that an independent cause of action
based upon an employer's intentional delay in authorizing medical
treatment is not available."1 Relying on Potts, the court determined
that an action was permitted outside the Act only if the employer or its
insurer committed fraud or another intentional tort, causing death, "and

53.
54.
55.
56.
S.E.2d
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 420, 361 S.E.2d at 526 (Benham, J., concurring specially).
270 Ga. at 17, 506 S.E.2d at 103.
See, e.g., Griggs v. All-Steel, 209 Ga. App. 253, 433 S.E.2d 89 (1993).
Potts, 270 Ga. at 16, 506 S.E.2d at 103 (quoting Griggs, 209 Ga. App. at 257, 433
at 92).
236 Ga. App. 754, 756, 513 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1999).
Id. at 754, 513 S.E.2d at 289.
Id. at 754-55, 513 S.E.2d at 289.
Id. at 756, 513 S.E.2d at 290.
Id. (citing Doss, 267 Ga. at 312, 477 S.E.2d at 577).
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then only if 'the tortious act was not an accident arising out of and in
the course of employment, and where a reasonable remedy for such
conduct is not provided by the Workers' Compensation Act.'"62
III.

SUBROGATION

The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed three cases on subrogation
this year, and all three demonstrate that the outcome of the seemingly

"simple" process of asserting a subrogation lien under O.C.G.A. section
34-9-11.1 is never simple.
In the first subrogation case, Payne v. Dundee Mills, Inc.,' the
claimant did not file his own suit but filed a motion to intervene in an
action filed by the employer against the tortfeasors that allegedly caused
the claimant's work-related injury. The claimant was originally injured
on March 21, 1995, when sulfuric acid escaped from a tank at his
employer's plant, and was paid workers' compensation benefits. On
March 21, 1997, the employer filed an action under O.C.G.A. section 349-11.16 against the contractors that allegedly caused the claimant's
injuries. The claimant received notice of the action after the expiration
of the statute of limitations. After the claimant attempted to intervene,
the employer dismissed its complaint. The trial court then denied the
claimant's motion to intervene, noting that the original action had been
dismissed.6
Although the right to intervene is dependent upon whether the motion
to intervene is timely, such a finding is entrusted to the sound discretion
of the trial court." "Where the motion to intervene appears before a
final judgment, where the rights of the intervening parties have not been
protected, and where the denial of intervention would dispose of the
intervening parties' cause of action, intervention should be allowed." 7
Although it was not clear when the employer notified the claimant of the
subrogation complaint, the claimant moved to intervene before any
judgment was rendered and before the employer dismissed its complaint.' Therefore, the court of appeals found that because (1) denial
of the claimant's motion to intervene would have barred the claimant's

62. Id. (quoting Potts, 270 Ga. at 16, 506 S.E.2d at 103).
63. 235 Ga. App. 514, 510 S.E.2d 67 (1998).
64. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
65. 235 Ga. App. at 514, 510 S.E.2d at 68.
66. Id. at 515,510 S.E.2d at 68 (quoting AC Corp. v. Myree, 221 Ga. App. 513, 515, 471
S.E.2d 922, 925 (1996)).
67. Id. (citing Allgood v. Georgia Marble Co., 239 Ga. 858, 239 S.E.2d 31 (1977); Kubler
v. Goerg, 197 Ga. App. 667, 399 S.E.2d 229 (1990)).
68. Id.
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independent tort claim against the contractors, (2) the motion to
intervene would not prejudice the employer, and (3) the employer failed
to protect the claimant's interests before dismissing, the superior court
abused its discretion in denying the motion to intervene.69 The case
was remanded to the trial court to allow the claimant to intervene.70
In North Brothers v. Thomas,7' the outcome was more favorable for
the employer. Seeking to recoup payments under the Act, the employer
intervened in the plaintiff-employee's negligence action against the
tortfeasor. North Brothers, the employer, intervened in the case and
contended that it had paid TTD benefits and over $60,000 in medical
benefits. The jury returned a special verdict finding for plaintiff and
awarding him $25,000 in medical expenses, zero for lost wages, and
$25,000 for pain and suffering. The trial judge entered an order finding
that plaintiff had not been fully and completely compensated for all his
economic and noneconomic losses and denied and dissolved North
Brothers' subrogation lien.72
North Brothers appealed, and the court of appeals found that the trial
court had been correct on the issue of the pain and suffering portion of
the verdict.73 Because North Brothers paid no sums for pain and
suffering, it was not entitled to recoup any money from that portion of
the verdict.74 The court of appeals found, however, that North Brothers
could recoup sums awarded to plaintiff for medical expenses.75 Because
plaintiff had no outstanding medical expenses or other medical claims,
the court determined that he had been fully and completely compensated
for his medical expenses.76
The third case was HomebuildersAss'n of Georgia v. Morris, 77 a case
that addressed the employer's right to present certain evidence at trial
in the unusual posture of a case proceeding to trial after settlement with
the tortfeasor. In Homebuilders plaintiff was working on a construction
crew and was injured when a truss gave way, causing him to fall ten feet
to the ground. When plaintiff filed a civil suit against the truss
designer, Georgia Mountain, alleging breach of warranty and negligent
design, the employer, Homebuilders, properly intervened in the case.
Plaintiff settled his dispute against Georgia Mountain for $200,000, and

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
236 Ga. App. 839, 513 S.E.2d 251 (1999).
Id. at 839-41, 513 S.E.2d at 252-53.
Id. at 841-42, 513 S.E.2d at 253-54.
Id.
Id. at 842, 513 S.E.2d at 254.
Id.
238 Ga. App. 194, 518 S.E.2d 194 (1999).
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Georgia Mountain was dismissed from the suit. This left plaintiff and
Homebuilders as the only parties. 7
Before trial, plaintiff alleged that Homebuilders' subrogation claim
was essentially a nullity because he had not been "fully and completely
compensated" by the settlement with Georgia Mountain. To resolve the
issue, the judge allowed the case to proceed to trial with only plaintiff
and Homebuilders as parties.79
On the day of trial, plaintiff filed a motion in limine to prevent
Homebuilders from introducing evidence of his contributory or comparative negligence or assumption of the risk. The trial court granted the
motion based on O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(b) which does not permit
consideration of such evidence. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury
returned a special verdict awarding plaintiff $924,902 in damages. The
trial court entered judgment on the verdict, ordering Homebuilders, the
intervener, take nothing from the settlement funds.80
Homebuilders appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion
in granting the motion in limine because had Georgia Mountain
remained a party, it would have been allowed to present to the jury
evidence of contributory/comparative negligence and assumption of the
risk. Homebuilders alleged that because it now stood in the shoes of the
tortfeasor, the jury should have heard that evidence."1 The appellate
court found that Homebuilders did not stand in the shoes of the
tortfeasor1 2 A workers' compensation insurer's subrogation rights are
derived from O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1, not from general tort law
principles, and the Act specifies that an employer/insurer is entitled to
proceeds only after the employee is fully and completely compensated."
The Act gives only one direction to the court for determining whether an
employee has been fully and completely compensated: to consider both
the workers' compensation benefits and the amount of the employee's
8 4
recovery against the third party.
The court of appeals found that the
trial court properly considered only the amount of workers' compensation
benefits plaintiff received and the amount of his settlement in determin-

78. Id. at 194-95, 518 S.E.2d at 195-96.
79. Id. at 195, 518 S.E.2d at 196.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 195-96, 518 S.E.2d at 196.
82. Id. at 196, 518 S.E.2d at 196.
83. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b)).
84. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b)). O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(b) states in pertinent
part that benefits paid shall "only be recoverable if the injured employee has been fully and
completely compensated."
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ing whether
he had been fully and completely compensated for his
85
losses.
IV. CASES

A.

Appeals
On more than one occasion since 1992, the Georgia Court of Appeals
has stated that there is no appeal to the superior court from a decision
of the Board other than a decision granting or denying compensation. 8
This year, that proposition was once again affirmed in GAC, MFG/Processing v. Busbin. 7
In Busbin the employee put forth his evidence at the hearing before
the administrative law judge ("the ALP). Without presenting its case,
the employer requested a directed verdict, arguing that there was no
evidence to support the employee's claim of an accident arising out of
and in the course and scope of his employment. The ALJ denied the
employee's claim without hearing any evidence from the employer. On
appeal, the appellate division held that the employee's evidence
established a prima facie case, and the claim was remanded to the ALJ
to take the employer's evidence. The employer appealed the appellate
division's order to remand the case, and the superior court affirmed the
remand.'
The court of appeals held that the superior court should have declined
review of the case, citing to well-settled law:
Nowhere in our [workers' compensation] statute is there provision for
an interlocutory appeal .... [O]nly a final award, order, judgment, or
decision of the board is subject to appeal to the superior. court ....
[T]he Workers' Compensation Act makes no provision for an appeal to
the superior court from a decision by the full board other than one
which grants or denies compensation.89

Thus, the court reminds workers' compensation practitioners that there
is no interlocutory appeal under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105.9 0

85. 238 Ga. App. at 197, 518 S.E.2d at 197.
86. See, e.g., Gilman Paper Co. v. Davis, 230 Ga. App. 364, 496 S.E.2d 469 (1998);
Fasher Painting & Decorating Co. v. Bordelon, 204 Ga. App. 196, 419 S.E.2d 82 (1992).
87. 233 Ga. App. 406, 406, 504 S.E.2d 270, 271 (1998).
88. Id.
89. Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).
90. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
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Arising Out of and In the Course of Employment

Whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment is
often a very fact-specific inquiry. Though there was no radical change
to existing law, two cases this year provided different factual twists on
the doctrines of "continuous employment" and "going to and coming from
work."
In the first case, Boyd Brothers Transportation Co. v. Fonville,9 ' the
employee, Fonville, was hired to drive tractor-trailers. After undergoing
an orientation session in Alabama at the employer's headquarters,
Fonville returned home to North Carolina to await assignment to a
trainer and was placed on the company's payroll. When work with a
trainer in North Carolina was not forthcoming, Fonville requested
permission to go to the employer's terminal in Georgia, where there was
an increased opportunity for assignment. Fonville stayed in temporary
lodging provided by the employer, remained on the payroll, and waited
for an assignment, but did no actual work besides parking one trailer.
Fonville was to start an assignment with a trainer on October 6, 1995.
On the evening of October 5th, Fonville left his lodging, walked to a
nearby convenience store to buy food, and was hit by a car while walking
back.92
The employer contended that going to get food was a personal mission
and that the injury was therefore not compensable. The ALJ, however,
applied the doctrine of continuous employment to find the claim
compensable. The appellate division, superior court, and the court of
appeals all affirmed the application of the doctrine. 93 The court of
appeals noted that the scope of a traveling employee's employment was
broader than that of an ordinary employee.94 The employee had to eat
and stay in Georgia out of necessity and in furtherance of the employer's
business.95 Even though the employee was not actually required to be
in Georgia awaiting assignment, his presence there was found to be of
mutual benefit to him and the company, he would be trained as a driver
sooner as opposed to later.96 The court found noteworthy that, but for
the accident, the employer would have benefitted from Fonville's
presence at the Georgia terminal. 97

91.

237 Ga. App. 721, 516 S.E.2d 573 (1999).

92. Id. at 721-23, 516 S.E.2d at 573-74.
93. Id. at 722-23, 516 S.E.2d at 574.
94. Id. at 722, 516 S.E.2d at 574.
95. Id. at 722-23, 516 S.E.2d at 574.

96. Id.
97. Id. at 723, 516 S.E.2d at 574.
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In the second case to address whether an accident arose out of and in
the course of employment, Mark the Mover v. Lancaster,9" the employee,
Lancaster, was in an accident while driving to work one morning. He
was an office worker who sometimes delivered furniture, using either a
company van or his own van. When his vehicle became inoperable,
Lancaster started walking to work. Lancaster later borrowed the
company owner's (his son-in-law's) personal vehicle for transportation
while Lancaster's van was being repaired. On the date of accident,
Lancaster was eating breakfast at a restaurant when he received a page.
Unable to contact the employer, Lancaster drove toward work, but was
in an accident and seriously injured.9 9
The appellate court upheld the Board's denial of Lancaster's claim.' 0
The general rule, the court noted, is that injuries en route to and from
work are not compensable. 10' The court further noted that there are
exceptions to the general rule, such as when the employer furnishes
transportation to the employee as an incident of employment or when
the employee is on call and is reimbursed for transportation. 01 2 The
Board had found, however, and the court of appeals agreed, that neither
exception applied to Lancaster.' 3 In the first place, the employer's
van was not provided to Lancaster as an incident of his employment but
as a personal favor by his son-in-law so that Lancaster could get his own
van fixed."° Second, even if Lancaster had previously been an on-call
employee when he used his own vehicle, that ended when Lancaster
began walking to work and did not resume when he borrowed transpor°
tation. O
Finally, the court pointed out that the employee admitted
that he would have been driving to work at the time of the accident even
if he had not been paged.'0° Driving to work was not a work-related
activity; therefore, the accident did not fall into any exception to the
general rule of noncompensability. 0 7

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

234 Ga. App. 319, 506 S.E.2d 673 (1998).
Id. at 319-20, 506 S.E.2d at 674.
Id. at 320-21, 506 S.E.2d at 675.
Id. at 320, 506 S.E.2d at 674.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., 506 S.E.2d at 674-75.
Id., 506 S.E.2d at 675.
Id., 506 S.E.2d at 674-75.
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C. Burden of Proof
Determining which party carries the burden of proof can, under
certain factual scenarios, be tricky. In Dan Vaden Chevrolet v.
Mann," s the proper placement of the burden of proof regarding
entitlement to TTD benefits was at issue. The employee, Mann, had a
history of prior back problems, including two back surgeries. On
February 22, 1996, Mann suffered an on-the-job lower back strain while
moving a safe. Mann continued working after the accident but was
hospitalized in March 1996 for both his back and for nonrelated health
problems. At that point, Mann filed a claim for TTD benefits. The
Board placed the initial burden of proof upon the employee and found
that he met his burden regarding the claim for benefits from March 6
through 27, 1996, but failed to show the injury was work-related after
that period.'" On appeal, the appellate division placed the burden of
proving a change in condition for the better upon the employer in order
to terminate the employee's benefits."'
According to the court of appeals, shifting the burden to the employer
in this manner was erroneous."' The court began its analysis from
the premise that "[a]n employee has the initial burden of proving a
disabling work-related injury entitling him to workers' compensation
benefits."" 2 The court acknowledged that in a change in condition
case, the burden might be shifted to the employer to prove that the
employee is not entitled to continuing benefits after the employee has
met his burden of proving an initial period of disability."' This was
not a change in condition case, however, because the employee's
condition had never been established by the payment of any benefits." 4 Consequently, the employee carried the full burden of proof
with respect to his entitlement to ongoing TTD benefits." 5
D.

CatastrophicInjury

One of the most notable workers' compensation decisions of the year
is Cobb County School District v. Barker."6 In this case the Georgia

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

234 Ga. App. 500, 506 S.E.2d 653 (1998).
Id. at 500, 506 S.E.2d at 654-55.
Id.
Id. at 501, 506 S.E.2d at 655.
Id. (citing Dasher v. City of Valdosta, 217 Ga. App. 351, 457 S.E.2d 259 (1995)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
271 Ga. 35, 518 S.E.2d 126 (1999).

564

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

Supreme Court ruled for the first time on the constitutionality of the

1992 version of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200.1(g)(6)."'
In Barker the
employer challenged the constitutionality of the statute, claiming that
it required the ALJ to adopt as conclusive on the issue of catastrophic
injury, a determination made in another forum where the employer had
no opportunity to be heard on the matter.'18
Following the rule in Georgia that an act of the General Assembly
should be interpreted so as to render it constitutional, if possible, the
court found that the former section 34-9-200.1(g)(6) did not create such
a conclusive presumption." 9 First, the court noted that nothing in
subsection (g)(6) specifically states that an award of Social Security
benefits is "conclusive" with regard to catastrophic injury.12' The court
stated that an award of Title 1112 or Title XVI' 22 Social Security
benefits cannot be presumed to qualify an employee for catastrophic
workers' compensation status because the underlying condition that
forms the basis of the Social Security award might not meet the
definition of "injury" found in the Act, while a catastrophic injury
must. 12

The court concluded subsection (g)(6) is not a conclusive

presumption, but a rebuttable
presumption that the employee suffered
24
a catastrophic injury.1

In light of the above ruling, the ALJ clearly is not required to accept
the decision of the Social Security Administration. Instead, he or she
must make an independent determination not only that the workers'
compensation injury meets the Social Security Administration's standard
of what is a disability, but also that the injury alleged to be catastrophic
falls within the coverage of the Act.'25 In other words, if the Social
Security award was based upon an injury or condition that was not
compensable under the Act, then the claim should
not be found to be
126
catastrophic for workers' compensation purposes.

117. 1992 Ga. Laws 1958 (amended 1995). That Code section defined "catastrophic
injury" to include "[Amny other injury of a nature or severity as has qualified or would
qualify an employee to receive disability income benefits under... Title XVI of the Social
Security Act." Id.
118. 271 Ga. at 36, 518 S.E.2d at 128.
119. Id. at 37-38, 518 S.E.2d at 128-29.
120. Id. at 38, 518 S.E.2d at 129.
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
123. 271 Ga. at 38-39, 518 S.E.2d at 130 (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4)).
124. Id. at 39, 518 S.E.2d at 130.
125. Id.
126. See id.
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Change in Condition
Each year the often complicated law regarding change in condition is
fleshed out by the appellate courts, case by case. Waycross Molded
Products, Inc. v. McKelvin 27 discussed two aspects of change in
condition: the employee's burden of proof and change in condition versus
new accident.
McKelvin injured his back on January 11, 1995, and income benefits
were paid. The employer eventually suspended payment of benefits
based upon a normal duty release from the treating physician, and the
employee reported back to work. Before McKelvin actually began to
work, however, he was terminated for reasons unrelated to his injury.
The following year McKelvin injured his back again moving a sofa at
home and was placed on work restrictions once again. McKelvin then
sought reinstatement of his income benefits. 2 '
The court of appeals' first question was whether McKelvin had
sustained a new injury or simply undergone a change in condition for
the worse from his previous injury. 2 9 The employer argued that the
couch-moving incident was a new accident not related to McKelvin's
employment, which terminated their responsibility for the back
problems. The ALJ disagreed finding that the employee's back was
aggravated by ordinary wear and tear from his everyday life, that it was
related to the on-the-job injury of 1995, and that he had undergone a
change in condition for the worse."3 The court of appeals held that
this determination was a question of fact for the Board, and
the AL's
13
findings in that regard would not be overturned on appeal.'
The second determination for the court of appeals was whether,
pursuant to Maloney v. Gordon County Farms,"2 McKelvin was
required to prove he made a good faith and diligent search for suitable
employment with another employer even though he had not actually
commenced working for the employer after the accident and before his
termination.' 33 The court began its analysis by citing the central
concern of the decision in Maloney, that the employee only receive
benefits if the economic change in condition for the worse is proximately

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

234 Ga. App. 46, 505 S.E.2d 826 (1998).
Id. at 46-47, 505 S.E.2d at 827.
Id. at 47, 505 S.E.2d at 828.
Id., 505 S.E.2d at 827-28.
Id., 505 S.E.2d at 828.
265 Ga. 825, 462 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
234 Ga. App. at 47, 505 S.E.2d at 828.
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caused by the injury."' The fact that McKelvin had not actually
begun to work before being fired was not a material distinction with
regard to placing a Maloney burden upon him."3 5 He had been released to return to work by the treating physician.'
Instead, the
crucial inquiry was whether his economic change was due to the
injury. 13 7 Proving a diligent search for other employment was, therefore, part of the employee's burden of proof if he sought additional
income benefits. 8' The court remanded the case to the Board to
determine whether McKelvin met his burden of proving that the injury
was the proximate cause of his economic situation." 9
In the second change in condition case this year, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Harris,4 ' the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether an
employee can turn down suitable full-time employment, accept a job
elsewhere that is only part-time, and then claim entitlement to TTD and
TPD benefits. Harris was injured and placed on light duty restrictions.
Her employer, Wal-Mart, made a suitable position available to her, on
a full-time basis, with no resulting wage loss. After working in the
position for only two hours, she walked off the job claiming she could not
perform and did not return. Several months later, however, Harris took
a part-time position as a sitter for an elderly woman that was within her
physical restrictions.'"
The ALJ determined that Harris was not entitled to total disability
benefits for the several months she was unemployed because she had
unjustifiably refused light duty employment. The AIJ also held that
Harris was entitled to partial disability benefits based upon the fact that
she was earning lower wages in her part-time job. The employer
appealed this second determination.4
In reversing the award of partial disability benefits, the court of
appeals pointed out that Wal-Mart had offered suitable light duty
employment that was never retracted.'
The intent of O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-240 was not to allow an employee to reject full-time light
duty work that gives no loss in wages, in favor of a similar position that

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 47-48, 505 S.E.2d at 828.
Id. at 48, 505 S.E.2d at 828.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
234 Ga. App. 401, 506 S.E.2d 908 (1998).
Id. at 401-02, 506 S.E.2d at 909-10.
Id.
Id. at 402, 506 S.E.2d at 910.
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is part-time work for less money.'" The court stated the employer is
not required to subsidize a loss of income resulting from the employee's
own choosing." The clear import of the decision in Harris is that the
Board is to look at diminution of earning capacity in a change in
condition case and not merely factual diminution in earnings.
A third change in condition case, Cox v. Pic-N-Save B.FL. Corp.,146
involved an effort to suspend benefits based upon a change in condition
for the better. Cox had been injured and was receiving TTD since 1992.
He owned an interest in a barbeque take-out prior to his injury but
expanded the business and took a more active role in its day-to-day
operations after he was out of work on total disability. The Georgia SelfInsurers' Guaranty Trust Fund ("GSIGTF") took over the file following
the employer's bankruptcy and terminated benefits based upon an actual
return to work. In support of its position, the GSIGTF had surveillance
which showed Cox engaged in such activities as waiting on customers,
cooking food, stocking supplies, and doing paperwork.'47
In holding that the employee's benefits should be reinstated, the court
noted that the superior court was constrained by the any evidence rule,
and that the Board's findings had to be construed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, in this case, the employee.'
It
appears, however, that the court of appeals may have preferred a
different outcome. 149 Not only did the court note that "[tihe evidence
in this case could support a finding that Cox had returned to work," 5 °
but it pointed out that the private investigator contradicted Cox in his
testimony regarding the extent of his involvement in the barbeque
business.' 5 ' Nevertheless, the court 5was
bound to follow the Board's
2
determination on the credibility issue.
F

Evidence

Two cases issued during the survey period were of interest with regard
to evidentiary matters in workers' compensation cases. The first,
Lastinger v. Mill & Machinery, Inc.,"' involved the use of a misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana as part of the employer's

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id., 506 S.E.2d at 909-10 (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240).
Id.
235 Ga. App. 12, 507 S.E.2d 849 (1998).
Id. at 12, 507 S.E.2d at 850.
Id. at 13, 507 S.E.2d at 850.
See id.
Id.

151. Id. at 12, 507 S.E.2d at 850.
152. Id. at 13, 507 S.E.2d at 850.
153. 236 Ga. App. 430, 512 S.E.2d 327 (1999).
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evidence in asserting an intoxication defense under O.C.G.A. section 349-17(b). 1 4 While at work, Lastinger fell several feet and injured
himself when a metal plate broke off from a conveyor belt. A drug test
performed at the emergency room where Lastinger was treated produced
evidence of marijuana and cocaine in Lastinger's blood. Lastinger
admitted using drugs five days before the injury but denied being
impaired by drugs on the day of his injury. The employer introduced
into evidence a certified copy of Lastinger's 1994 misdemeanor conviction
for marijuana possession.'55
The Board determined that the presumption of intoxication provided
for in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17(b) applied to the facts of this case and
that Lastinger had not rebutted this presumption in part because his
testimony was impeached by his prior misdemeanor conviction. 5 ' The
court of appeals reversed, however, based upon a supreme court decision
finding that "a misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana is
not a crime of moral turpitude, and thus may not be used to impeach a
witness."'5 7 Because the misdemeanor conviction was the sole basis
for the Board's finding that Lastinger's testimony had been impeached,
the court of appeals rejected the employer's argument that admission of
the misdemeanor marijuana conviction was harmless error. 5 ' The
case was remanded to redetermine if Lastinger's testimony would have
159
been impeached without evidence of the misdemeanor conviction.
While proof of a conviction for prior drug use may be relevant in some
cases in which the intoxication defense is raised, it is clear that a
misdemeanor conviction for marijuana possession cannot be used as
impeachment because the courts have established that this is not a
crime of moral turpitude." °
An evidentiary issue peculiar to workers' compensation is the
admissibility of accident reports that employers are required to fill out
and file with the Board after knowledge of an on-the-job injury."6' The
Act specifically prohibits the use of such accident reports as evidence
"against any employer in any action at law brought by any employee for
the recovery of damages or in any proceedings under this chapter."'62

154.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17(b) (1998 & Supp. 1999).

155. 236 Ga. App. at 430-31, 512 S.E.2d at 328.
156. Id. at 431, 512 S.E.2d at 328.
157. Id. (citing O'Neal v. Kammin, 263 Ga. 218, 430 S.E.2d 586 (1993)).

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 430-31, 512 S.E.2d at 328.
161.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-12(a) (1998 & Supp. 1999).

162. Id. § 34-9-61(b).

1999]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

569

In Mays v. Farah U.S.A., Inc.," the question arose whether an
employer's First Report of injury that was filed with the Board could be
used in a wrongful death action based on a vehicular collision involving
two employees and resulting in one's death. The trial court excluded the
First Report of injury from evidence, and the court of appeals affirmed."
Quoting the express provisions of O.C.G.A. section 34-961(b), the court of appeals found
that the First Report of injury could not
" 165
be used in any "action at law.

G. Malpractice
A case with an outcome that might surprise many is McMann v.
Mockler.'
Though not a workers' compensation case, this claim for
legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
implied contract of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud arose out of a
workers' compensation case.' 67 McMann filed this claim alleging that
her attorney, Mockler, failed to file an appeal from the ALJ's denial of
her workers' compensation case. The attorney filed a motion for
summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court."
On
review, the court of appeals affirmed the granting of summary judgment
on all grounds.' 69
The court began by citing the essential elements which must be proved
for a professional malpractice action:
"(1) A legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct... ; (2) a breach
of this standard; (3) a legally attributable causal connection between
the conduct and the resulting injury; and, (4) some loss or damage
flowing to the plaintiffs legally" protected
interest as a result of the
17 0
alleged breach of the legal duty.
In particular, the court noted that in a legal malpractice case there must
be proof that the attorney's negligence proximately caused the client's
harm. 171 When the negligence alleged is an attorney's failure to
appeal, the plaintiff can establish the requisite causal relationship by

163. 236 Ga. App. 1, 510 S.E.2d 868 (1999).
164. Id. at 1, 510 S.E.2d at 869.
165. Id. at 2, 510 S.E.2d at 870.
166. 233 Ga. App. 279, 503 S.E.2d 894 (1998).
167. Id. at 279, 281, 503 S.E.2d at 895, 897.
168. Id. at 279-80, 281, 503 S.E.2d at 895-96, 897.
169. Id. at 282, 503 S.E.2d at 898.
170. Id. at 280, 503 S.E.2d at 896 (quoting Whitehead v. Cuffie, 185 Ga. App. 351, 352,
364 S.E.2d 87, 89 (1987)).
171. Id. (quoting Whitehead, 185 Ga. App. at 352, 364 S.E.2d at 89).

570

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

showing that the appellate court would have reversed72the lower court's
ruling and a favorable outcome would have resulted.1
Applying those legal principles to the facts before it, the court of
appeals held that McMann presented insufficient evidence of causation.171 She failed to include a record of the workers' compensation
proceedings in her claim for malpractice. 174 Thus, the trial court
assumed that the AU-'s findings were supported by the record, and
therefore, the award would have been affirmed upon appeal. 175 Failure
to appeal something that would have been unsuccessful or frivolous is
not, the court pointed out, harmful to the client.176 Because there was
no harm from the177alleged professional malpractice, summary judgment
was appropriate.

H.

Overpayment of Benefits
In Bahadoriv. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,'178 a case that was
discussed in last year's Survey, 79 the Georgia Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine which statute of limitations applied to an
employer's claim for reimbursement of disability benefits paid to the
claimant when he was working.'
The claimant was injured in 1989
when he worked for Sizzler. He recovered and went to work for another
employer. He sought benefits in 1992 and 1993, which were paid by
Sizzler. Subsequently, the employer learned that the claimant was
actually working during the time he claimed to be unable to work in
both 1992 and 1993. The employer filed for a hearing in February 1995,
seeking to controvert the 1993 claim and to recoup benefits paid for the
1992 claim. The claimant withdrew his 1993 claim and contested
Sizzler's action to be reimbursed for the 1992 benefits, arguing that
adjudication of overpayment issues could only take place in conjunction
with a change in condition hearing.' 81 The court of appeals determined that the Board could hear an action for overpayment in cases

172. Id. (quoting Jaraysi v. Soloway, 215 Ga. App. 531, 532, 451 S.E.2d 521, 522
(1994)).
173. Id. at 281, 503 S.E.2d at 896.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 270 Ga. 203, 507 S.E.2d 467 (1998).
179. In the court of appeals, the case was entitled Bahadori v. Sizzler #1543, 230 Ga.
App. 52, 505 S.E.2d 23 (1997). See H. Michael Bagley, et al., Workers' Compensation, 50
MERCER L. REV. 401 (1998).
180. 270 Ga. at 203, 507 S.E.2d at 468-69.
181. 230 Ga. App. at 52-53, 505 S.E.2d at 23-24.
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other than a change in condition case and that a four-year statute of
limitations applied."i 2
The supreme court agreed with the claimant that the legislature
drafted O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(d)(2) 1 narrowly and that the
wording of the statute was intended to limit claims for overpayment to
change in condition cases only.'" Thus, because the statute of limitations in change in condition cases is two years, the court of appeals erred
in holding that any other statute of limitations applied.I"5 In addition,
the supreme court stated that the employer's argument that the statute
of limitations should have been tolled due to the claimant's fraud had to
be supported by evidence, and the court remanded the case to the Board
for further findings.'
I.

PsychologicalInjury
After several years of significant appellate activity in the area of
compensability of psychological claims, there has been a much needed
calm. No new ground was broken this year. However, the old rule that
a psychological injury must be related to or caused by an actual physical
injury in order for it to be compensable was reaffirmed by the court.
In Bibb County v. Short,is7 an employee claimed that while his
physical injury had healed, he suffered ongoing psychological problems
that resulted in total disability. Short was a security guard at Lake
Tobesofkee and was sent to the lake during a period of flooding in an
effort to help prevent damage. A steel door fell on his foot and fractured
two toes. After he was released to return to work without restrictions,
Short experienced increasing anxiety and depression, and his work
attendance became erratic. He threatened his employer, abused alcohol,
and eventually obtained disability retirement. Short also sought
reinstatement of benefits, claiming that his psychological disability,
resulting from the injury to his toes, was a change in condition for the
worse. 188

The AL rejected Short's claim, concluding that there was not
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the employee's psychological
disability and problems were, in fact, causally related to his toe injury.
The superior court, on the other hand, found that there was medical

182. Id. at 53-55, 505 S.E.2d at 24-25.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(d)(2) (1998 & Supp. 1999).
270 Ga. at 204, 507 S.E.2d at 469-70.
Id. at 204-05, 507 S.E.2d at 470.
Id. at 207, 507 S.E.2d at 470.
238 Ga. App. 291, 518 S.E.2d 484 (1999).
Id. at 291, 518 S.E.2d at 484-85.
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evidence to support the relationship, between the toe injury and the
psychological problems, entitling the employee to benefits.'8 9 The court
of appeals reversed the superior court, stating that it was bound by the
any evidence standard of review."
There was evidence, upon which
the Board had relied, to show that the compensable foot injury neither
precipitated nor contributed to Short's psychological problems. 9 ' The
claim for disability benefits was therefore properly denied by the Board,
and that
decision should not have been overturned by the superior
92
1

court.

J.

Statute of Limitations

In Gann v. Poe,'93 the court of appeals addressed the issue of
whether the statute of limitations precludes receipt of benefits when a
claimant fails to file a claim within one year.9
Charles Gann was
injured on December 11, 1995, while working as a groundsman at a
junkyard. The employer did not have workers' compensation coverage
and paid no medical or income benefits to the claimant. More than one
year after the injury, the claimant asserted a claim for benefits. There
was conflicting evidence with regard to how many employees worked for
the junkyard, but the superior court found that even if the employer had
the requisite number of employees to require him to maintain workers'
compensation coverage,' 95 Gann's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82.196
The claimant argued that because he had been forced to seek his own
medical treatment and the employer did not maintain a panel of
physicians, the statute of limitations had not run. The claimant urged
the court to apply Georgia Institute of Technology v. Gore,'97 which
held that for statute of limitations purposes, the admitted failure to
maintain a posted panel renders medical treatment received by the

189. Id. at 292, 518 S.E.2d at 485.
190. Id. (quoting Owens-Brockway Packaging v. Hathorn, 227 Ga. App. 110, 111, 488
S.E.2d 495, 496 (1997)).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 236 Ga. App. 138, 512 S.E.2d 1 (1999).
194. Id. at 139, 512 S.E.2d at 1.
195. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-2(a) (1998) provides that the Act is not applicable to any
employer "that has regularly in service less than three employees in the same business."
196. 236 Ga. App. at 139, 512 S.E.2d at 1. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82 provides for a
statute of limitations of one year unless the employer provides for remedial treatment or
pays weekly benefits. Then the statute of limitations is one year from the last remedial
treatment or two years after the last payment of weekly benefits. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82 (1998
& Supp. 1999).
197. 167 Ga. App. 359, 306 S.E.2d 338 (1983).
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employee on account of the injury to be remedial treatment furnished by
the employer."' s However, in Gann, because the evidence was contradictory and it was not clear that the employer was subject to the Act,
there was no "admitted" failure to comply with the Act, so Gore did not
apply.'
The court of appeals determined that the superior court
properly ruled the claim was time-barred.2 0
K

Statutory Employer

The court addressed two cases dealing with the statutory employer
provisions of the Act. In Greg Fisher,Ltd. v. Samples, °1 the owner of
a carpentry business, Samples, was hired by Greg Fisher, Ltd. ("Fisher")
to do framing work on a building project. Samples had purchased
workers' compensation coverage for his employees but had exempted
himself from coverage. After he was hurt and learned that he could not
file a claim against his own coverage, Samples filed a claim against
Fisher. The ALJ found the claim was not compensable, determining that
Samples was an independent contractor and also that as a sole
proprietor, he had not affirmatively elected to be covered under his own
company's workers' compensation coverage. The claimant appealed,
asserting that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-124(b) 20 2 stops insurers from
asserting any defenses as to coverage. 0 3
The court of appeals noted that the Board had already made findings
of fact based on the evidence that Samples was an independent
contractor and a sole proprietor who had not elected to be covered under
his own policy and that because there was evidence to support these
findings, the court did not have any authority to substitute itself as the
fact-finding body in lieu of the Board. 204 Even so, the court addressed
Samples's argument that the language of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-124
would defeat Fisher's contentions that its policy did not cover Samples. 208 Because Samples did not elect to be covered as an employee
under his own company's policy, he remained in the status of owner and

198.

236 Ga. App. at 139-40, 512 S.E.2d at 1-2 (citing Gore, 167 Ga. App. at 359, 306

S.E.2d at 338).
199. Id. at 140, 512 S.E.2d at 2.

200. Id.
201.

238 Ga. App. 825, 520 S.E.2d 280 (1999).

202.

O.C.G.A. section 34-9-124(b) (1998) provides in pertinent part, "an insurer who

issues to an employer subject to this chapter a policy of compensation insurance covering
an employee or employees ordinarily exempt from its provisions shall not plead the
exemption as a defense."

203. 238 Ga. App. at 825-26, 828, 520 S.E.2d at 281.
204. Id. at 827, 520 S.E.2d at 282.
205. Id. at 828, 520 S.E.2d at 282.
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employer, and the language
of section 34-9-124 applies only to employ2 6
ees, not to an employer.
In Warden v. Hoar Construction Co.,2 7 the spouse of a deceased
employee filed a wrongful death action against a general contractor for
the death of her husband. Leonard Warden was working for Fulton
Roofing, a subcontractor of Hoar Construction ("Hoar"), when he fell
through a roof. He died from his injuries and was paid workers'
compensation benefits by Fulton Roofing. His widow filed suit against
Hoar for wrongful death. The trial court granted summary judgment to
Hoar, and the widow appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing
that the court's interpretation of the exclusive remedies statute in
Wright9 Associates v. Rieder 2°' was erroneous and violated due process.

20

The court had held in Rieder "that an injured employee of a subcontractor could not maintain a tort action against the principal contractor,
even when the principal contractor did not pay workers' compensation
benefits."2 10 The court reasoned in Rieder that the principal contractor
should receive tort immunity because it was liable to pay benefits under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-8.211 If tort liability depended on the actual
payment of benefits, then the general contractor who required subcontractors to carry insurance would be liable in tort whereas the general
212
contractor who did not require insurance would escape tort liability.
In revisiting this issue in Warden, the court noted once again that its
interpretation of the exclusive remedy provision was reasonably related
to a legitimate legislative purpose and therefore, did not violate due
process. 2 3 Additionally, because the legislature had not amended the
Act to overturn the tort immunity granted to general contractors under
Rieder, the court upheld summary judgment in Warden.214

206. Id., 520 S.E.2d at 282-83.
207. 269 Ga. 715, 507 S.E.2d 428 (1998).
208. 247 Ga. 496, 277 S.E.2d 41 (1981).
209. 269 Ga. at 715, 507 S.E.2d at 429.
210. Id. at 716, 507 S.E.2d at 429-30 (citing Rieder, 247 Ga. at 496, 277 S.E.2d at 41).
211. Id., 507 S.E.2d at 430 (citing Rieder, 247 Ga. at 496, 277 S.E.2d at 41). See
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
212. 269 Ga. at 716, 507 S.E.2d at 430 (citing Rieder, 247 Ga. at 496, 277 S.E.2d at 41).
213. Id. at 718, 507 S.E.2d at 431.
214. Id. at 717-18, 507 S.E.2d at 430-31.

